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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 15 Oc'roBER, 1962 NumBER 4
The "Reception" of Defamation
By the Common Law
COLIN RHts LovLL*
Professor Lovell outlines the historical background of libel and slander
and traces the separate conception and development of the two torts
through the various courts of early England, explaining the reasons for
ultimate division of defamation into two distinct actions.
The rather low opinion held by Mr. Bumble concerning the logic of the
law must be set off by the Holmesian reminder that not "logic," but
"experience" has kept the law viable. The warning has peculiar applica-
bility in looking at the common law doctrines on defamation. Only the
experience of history can explain why, in contrast to Roman civil law
systems with their view that all defamations and insults are injuriae, with
a single remedial action, the common law has no interest in mere bad
language' and goes on to have two separate actions for defamation. More-
over, these are quite artificially distinguished by the form of the defamation,
with each action having different definitions, requirements, and defences,
the result being that occasionally the mere form determines whether the
common law will give any relief for a defamatory statement.
If Richard Roe calls John Doe a "card sharp" clearly and explicitly before
fifty members of their club, the board of governors will probably ask for
Doe's resignation; he will have to resign his commission in the Guards; and
he may even have to emigrate to the colonies as a remittance man. But
Doe will learn from his solicitor that the law affords him no relief against
Roe and would do so only if he, Doe, were a dealer at Monte Carlo. If,
however, Roe should choose to write on a small piece of paper that Doe
acts like (not actually is) a card sharp, rather than speak his charge, and
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shows this 'statement to the club steward, Doe can bring an action against
R6e. Shiould Roe flatly call Doe a 'lying horsethief" in the presence of the
club's charwoman, the common law will take no note of the imputation
coilcerning Doe's veracity, but it will regard as actionable the charge of
this type of theft (however unlikely in this year of 1962).
In the subsequent actions Roe will find that although the common law
supposedly places the burden of proof in a civil action upon the plaintiff,
somehow it is he, Roe, who will be regarded with doubt by the court,
while Doe will sit in outraged rectitude after proving that Roe did, indeed,
"publish" his defaming words. Roe will also discover that his logical
defense of "justification," setting up the truth of his allegations, however
defamatory, is not so simple under the rules of law, which actually make it
easier for him to justify his explicit verbal charge than his mere written
insinuation. .Clearly Mr. Bumble has the advantage, unless history explains
why the common law is apparently so devoid of logic when it looks at
defamation.
The modem treatment of defamation in two separate actions with
different doctrines is the end result of long centuries of ignorance of the
entire subject by the common law. Not until long after its formative years
closed toward the beginning of the 14th century did forces and circum-
stances outside the law force it to recognize defamation. It then "received"
defamation in two sudden, but quite separate, gulps, which still have yet
to be completely digested by it.
I. Tim CANON LAW THROUGH EDWABD I
,'Although Anglo-Saxon customary law gave a required monetary sub-
stitute for direct revenge for insults, it gave scant attention to defamation
-the imputation to the injured party of some wrongful deed. Defamation
fell to the canon law, which, however, was applied before 1066 by the
same courts which employed secular law, and in the same manner. The
only difference was that when the hundred (and later the manorial) or
shire court dealt with matters falling under ecclesiastical law, the priest or
bishop, respectively, presided to explain the law of the Holy Church to the
assembly, which, however, as in secular cases, arrived at its decisions by a
consensus of opinion. Essentially, the injured party in these defamation
actions was seeking vindication of his character; and this he received in
the form of a public apology from the person guilty of making the false
allegation, if proof by compurgation or ordeal went in his favor.
This "remedy," however, was unlikely to satisfy great men, whose
"honor" demanded a direct justice in the equity of arms; but such "satis-
faction" was likely to lead to the very disorder which Church and monarch
wished to abate. The Laws of Alfred the Great2 (compiled about 880), a
2. 1 ENGLISH HIsToIcAL DocumENTs 372 (Whitelock ed. 1955).
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typical collection of some of the customary law, gave required alternatives
to such direct revenge:
If anyone is guilty of public slander, and it is proved against him, it is
to be compensated with no lighter penalty than the cutting off of his tongue,
with the proviso that it be redeemed at no cheaper rate than it is valued in
proportion to the wergild.3
This doom stands out in such solitary grandeur in the midst of the indiffer-
ence about defamation in other collections of Anglo-Saxon law that it is
possible that Alfred with his strong personality and interest in; order,
although he denied his ability to do so, may have actually intruded this
"solution" for defamation into the dooms set down at his command.
The doom does not make clear whether upon proof of the false words
the assembly or the injured party was to select the penalty., However, the
doom is an interesting foreshadowing of later common law views on! defa-.
mation, although there is no direct historical connection between them.-
There is first of all the requirement of "publication" of slander before it is
actionable, and it is fairly clear that even at this early date the defence of
truth was not highly regarded by a government with the basic aim of
maintaining social order. What must be proved (by compurgation or
ordeal, not by evidence, which Anglo-Saxons shunned) wasthe making of
the statement, not its truth or falsity. Finally, although the translation of
the Latin of the doom as "slander" is as good as any, it is not the slander
of the later common law, oral defamation. Although prevailing mass
illiteracy meant that most defamations would be of this category, the
doom's "slander" would also cover the few written imputations; so that
Anglo-Saxon law did not know a differentiation of actions distinguished
by the form of the defamation as would the later common law.
Undoubtedly, the doom was utterly ineffectual in its purpose of keeping
order. Despite the satisfaction which a man might have in seeing his
defamer mutilated, or in receiving his wergild during his own lifetime, this
doom did not provide a "remedy" of much appeal to "honorable" men, who
at all times have preferred the "affair of honor" to the courts for dealing
with defamation. Furthermore, even a strong Anglo-Saxon monarch, such
as Alfred, had no juridical-administrative agencies to enforce any doom,
even on the central level of government; and on the local level few men
could ever have heard of this doom.
Free men continued to use the remedy of the sword for defamation. As
their number declined with the growth of manorial jurisdictions, the num-
ber of people theoretically incapable of bearing arms increased. For these
3. 1 ENGLISH HiSrOmcAL DocUmfENTs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 378 (Law No. 32).
It must be emphasized that despite the title, these dooms were not "made" by the
monarch, but instead collected under his direction.
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servile persons the remedy for hard words became monetary, as determined
by their fellows in manorial courts.4 Since much of this "defamation" was
merely vituperative language and its monetary satisfaction depended on
orders of courts composed of and serving the less-than-free, mere insult
sank below the level of true defamation as recognized by both canon and
later the common law. Modem common law jurisdictions possessing a tort
of abusive and insulting language distinguish it from the defamatory torts
and invariably have it as the result of relatively recent legislative interven-
tion in the law.5
This situation was not changed by the Norman Conquest except that the
establishment of separate Church courts by William I, who otherwise
confirmed English law for his English subjects, placed the administration
of the canon law remedy for defamation in tribunals with different pro-
cedures from either the English or Norman feudal assembly courts. A
single judge, after the Norman Conquest a canonist, staffed each of the
ecclesiastical courts, which rose in hierarchical order from the court of the
archdeacon through those of the bishop and archbishop, although these
latter two busy prelates rarely appeared, instead giving this duty to a
chancellor. Unlike the secular courts, the jurisprudence of the Church
recognized appellate jurisdiction, exercised by the latter two courts, along
with some partially overlapping original jurisdiction, with possible final
appeal (with royal permission) to the papal curia. However, the great
bulk of ecclesiastical cases began and ended in the archdeacon's court.
This hierarchical arrangement indicated a considerably more sophis-
ticated jurisprudence for the ecclesiastical than for customary secular law,
and the Norman Conquest coincided with the beginning of a great
burgeoning of canon law, which grew rapidly away from its Roman law
base. Combining Holy Writ (particularly the New Testament), the de-
crees of the early Church councils, and papal decretals into a single entity,
canon law became capable of codification by the 12th and 13th centuries.0
Canon law regarded defamation as part of its jurisdictional competence
over the "cure (or care) of souls." Like its Roman law ancestor, it was
indifferent as to whether the defamation were oral or written, although the
general illiteracy of the time meant that most of it would be the former.
Unlike early Roman law, which viewed defamation as an injuria, requiring
compensation to the injured, or later Roman law, which regarded certain
types of defamation as crimes to be punished,7 canon law considered it to
4. Wade, supra note 1, at 65.
5. Id. at 80-81 & nn.121 & 122.
6. The codification by Gratian indicates a law, which within the areas of its com-
petence was remarkably coherent and surprisingly sophisticated. See also Veeder, Tht
History of the Law of Defamation, in 3 SELFCT ESSAYS iNh ANGLo-AMERICAN LmAL
HISTORY 446 (1909).
7. Id. at 468.
[ VOL. 15
DEFAMATION AND THE COMMON LAW
be a sin, demanding penance before there could be absolution of the sin-
ner. The remedy of ecclesiastical courts was thus the correction of the
sinner, not the indemnification of the party injured by the false statement
nor the punishment of the criminal. Canon law knew that however
unfortunate and wrong bad language might be, it was not defamatory
unless and until it made allegations of a crime cognizable by it.8 Thus to
call a man a "dog" was unfortunate; to call him a "thief" defamatory.
As in other ecclesiastical actions, procedure in defamation cases turned
on the character of the single judge as one of both fact and law. Initiation
of the action came on the accusation by the injured party of his defamer
before the court; or the complainant could make a private denunciation to
the judge, who might then act. The judge, himself, could initiate proceed-
ings by an inquisition, an inquiry, usually on the basis of information from
his apparitors (similar to the later Masters in Chancery), who in time,
therefore, would incur vast unpopularity for their Paul Pry activities.9
Once initiated, the action moved rapidly, with the judge taking sworn
oral testimony, sworn written statements (including those from his appari-
tors), and applying the ex-officio oath of canon law, whereby both parties
could be compelled to testify.'0 Such pleading as there was in the arch-
deacon's court, which disposed of the bulk of defamation cases, usually
followed at the close of evidence. Determination of the facts fell to the
judge, who then applied canon law in rendering his decision. If it were
one of guilt, the convicted person as a sinner was liable to do public
penance. Wrapped in a white shroud and holding a lighted candle while
kneeling, he acknowledged his "false witness" in the presence of the priest
and parish wardens and begged the pardon of the injured party," who
as a Christian was bound to forgive. The whole affair ended with the
absolution of the sinner. Should he prove contumacious, the Church court
could order his excommunication; and should he prove so hardened in
sin that this dire penalty did not move him, the spiritual court could call
upon the royal sheriff to seize and hold his goods until he should truly
repent and do the bidding of the court. This ultimate method of enforce-
ment of ecclesiastical sentences, recognized by the Constitutions of Claren-
don in 1164,12 bespoke the medieval ideal of the division between things
of God and Caesar, with Caesar to assist God.
8. FiFooT, HIsTORY AND SotmcEs OF TE COMMON LAw-ToRT AND CONTRACT
126 (1949).
9. Carr, English Law of Defamation, 18 L.Q. Rlv. 255, 269 (1902); Veeder, supra
note 6, at 452.
10. For a vitriolic attack on this ex-officio procedure shortly before its abolition see
MoiucE, BRaF TREATSE ON OATHES (Circa 1590).
11. Carr, supra note 9, at 272.
12. The inclusion of the method in the Constitutions is significant in that they
represented the customs of William I as to relations with the Church, as expressed to
Henry II by a particularly large session of curia regis.
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The canon law definition of defamation turned on whether the allegation
was of a wrongful act under that law. This allegation had to be made to
a third party, that is, "published"; urbane Churchmen knew that allegations
heard only by the parties in interest might not have been heard at all.
While canon law did not particularly favor the defendant in any action, it
provided him a sure defence in defamation-truth-for the simple reason
that if the allegation were true, it could not have been false.13 Having
thus provided this defence, however, canon law then laid the burden of
proving the truth of the statement upon the defendant for the logical
reason that he had made it.
Meanwhile, the common law in its growth, which was particularly rapid
during the 13th century when new writs, pleading, and stare decisis greatly
enlarged and refined its remedies, did not "know" defamation. Royal
judges, usually churchmen until the last quarter of that century, 14 had little
reason to bring into that law actions which were producing revenue for
them in their own ecclesiastical courts. The common law remedy of
monetary payments for damages, assessed by local juries, did not lend
itself to a simple application in the measurement of damages to such an in-
tangible as a man's reputation. The further concern of the common law
for free tenures, and so free men, meant that even as royal courts with this
law were breaking feudal jurisprudence, they still took no notice of the
monetary damages being awarded to the large number of servile people by
manorial courts for insulting epithets.' 5
Toward the close of this early formative period of the common law, it
explicitly denied any interest in defamation. In 1285 royal justices assisted
Edward I in the formulation of the statute, Circumspecte Agatis,16 which
in its definition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction included defamation actions,
"providing that money be not demanded, but the suit is prosecuted for
punishment of sin." The unwillingness of the king and justices to enlarge
traditional canon law remedies to include payments to the injured party
did not indicate common law readiness to provide this remedy. In 1295 a
defamation case between two Irish gentlemen came before Parliament as
the highest court, which asked the justices for their views. In a unanimous
opinion the justices declared that the common law, and so its courts, had
13. Carr, supra note 9, at 268.
14. Edward I (1272-1307) gradually secularized the bench, in part due to his
quarrel with Pope Boniface VIII over exactions to be imposed on the clergy.
15. 8 Hot.nswoRn, A IMToRY OF ENGLIsH LA-w 335 (1926) [hereinafter cited as
HOLDswoRTH]; see also Wade, supra note 1, at 65.
16. 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1285). The wording of the statute, "It has been granted
already," makes it clear that the crown was declaring existing ecclesiastical jurisdiction,
not in any way creating a new portion of it. It has been argued that the quoted words
may refer to a promise to the Church by Edward following the Baronial War, but that
the words could refer to the practice relative to ecclesiastical jurisdiction since Wil-
ham I.
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no jurisdiction over defamation, which instead fell to ecclesiastical trib-
unals..7
Although this opinion was entered on the Rolls of Parliament, this was
not the Parliament of later years, either in structure or function. While it
is true that this Parliament of 1295 had borough and county representa-
tives,18 along with proctors for the lower clergy, joined with the great
nobles and the royal Council in Parliament, the late 13th century definition
of Parliament was a body consisting of the king, his Council (including
the justices), and great nobles receiving individual summonses for this
temporary enlargement of the "official" element. Non-noble elements were
not essential to this definition of Parliament, and, in fact, appeared at only
a few of the meetings denoted as "Parliament" during the reign of Edward
I. Not for another fifty years would county and borough representatives
be essential elements of Parliament.
During the reign of Edward I there was no reason for these non-noble
persons to be at every Parliament, because its chief function during that
reign was judicial.19 Non-noble elements had no claim to participate in
this business, which usually consisted of giving general directions for the
ultimate disposition of a particularly knotty case. However, normally the
noble legal amateurs took the advice, as they did here, of the justices,
who thus controlled the principal business of late 13th century Parliaments.
Neither taxation, which the crown could accomplish by negotations with
affected groups, nor legislation, which the king after the breakdown of
feudal limitations promulgated on his own authority, was the business of
Parliament for a long time. To say, therefore, that Parliament acquiesced
in this judicial self-denial of competence over defamation by failing to
legislate to the contrary implies that Parliament possessed this power,
which would have surprised (and shocked) its members in 1295.
Furthermore, there is no certainty that the members of this Parliament
ever heard the judicial opinion. Parliament often discussed issues, which
it then frequently turned over to the Council for ultimate disposition, in
this instance by the Council's judicial element. However, the royal clerks,
with attitudes toward work procedures anticipatory of those of their
bureaucratic descendants, entered the disposition of all issues raised in
Parliament on its Rolls, even though the members might have been long
17. Veeder, supra note 6, at 456; 2 HorDswoRnl 366 (1923).
18. And for that reason called the "Model Parliament" as foreshadowing the later
composition of that body.
19. This was the function it inherited as the descendant of curia regis, the
ultimate source of all courts and Parliament. It may be noted here that this writer's
view as to Parliamentary reaction, or rather the lack of it, does not agree with the view
of Holdsworth. 2 HoLDswoTH 366 (1923). Although it is not easy to part with his
opinion, this author feels that researches done on Parliament after Holdsworth had
written give support to the differing view expressed here.
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gone when the decision on a particular question was finally given and
entered.
By the close, therefore, of the early formative period of the common
law, it offered no remedies for defamation. Canon law offered the remedy
of public penance, and so vindication of the injured. For servile persons
the manorial courts gave damages for bad language, which manorial
jurisprudence approached more from the view of insults than of any real
damage suffered by the complainant from hard words. The great man,
therefore, dissatisfied with the type of vindication offered him by ecclesias-
tical courts and unable (and unwilling) to secure the monetary relief given
by courts for his social inferiors, still found that his only real satisfaction
for defaming words was his own sword.
II. IbamUENCE OF MERcANI=E DEvELoPmnr
Soon after the firm molding of the common law by the great statutes of
Edward I, changes in the economic and social facts of English life pro-
duced a small but vocal middle-class, whose mercantile attitudes made
them aware of how defamation could hurt them in their most tender
portions-their purses. Such men, however, by training and personal dis-
position, were unlikely to seize their weapons to maintain their financial
reputation. Simultaneously, the ranks of the servile began to thin, particu-
larly after the Black Death in the mid-14th century wrecked both serfdom
and the old manorial courts, although the latter would linger, half-
forgotten, until the early 19th century 20 Defamation being unknown to
the common law and provided with no real relief from the moribund
manorial courts, these facts led to an increase of such actions in the Church
courts, which until the latter part of the 15th century did a brisk business
in them.21 The crown did not object to this tendency and sought to remedy
the great weakness of ecclesiastical relief-at least to the new middle-
classes-namely, its failure to provide real deterrence to potential de-
famers in the commercial world of the 14th century. In 1315 a statute
authorized Church courts in addition to penance (by then of questionable
deterrent value) to order corporal punishment, that is, whipping, of
offenders against the canon law prohibition of false witness, but with the
proviso that this punishment could be commuted to a fine, set by and paid
to the particular prelate "owning" the court.2
This secular statutory reinforcement of the canon law view that defama-
tion was a sin to be punished did give greater deterrence value to the
'remedies" afforded by ecclesiastical courts. Some ingenious persons, after
20. As the courts leet.
21. FIFooT, op. cit. .suprae note 8, at 126-27; I-hcsoN & CAnTaE-Ruci, THE LAw oF
LmEL AND SLANDER 7 (1953).
22. De diversis Libertatibos Clero concessis, 9 Edw. 2, c. 4 (1315).
1058 [VeOL. 15
DEFAMATION AND THE COMMON LAW
having been acquitted of crimes in the royal courts, hailed all members of
the grand jury which had indicted them before ecclesiastical courts on
charges of defamation 23 Such a practice could stultify royal criminal
jurisdiction, and a statute of 1327 authorized and required the Chancellor
and royal justices to direct writs of prohibition to Church courts against
their hearing such "defamation" actions.24
The juridical situation whereby in practice Church courts alone dealt
with defamation for free persons meant that mercantile persons wishing
monetary relief for defamation had to turn to their own courts of the great
fairs, the courts of pie powder, which used summary procedures so that
merchants could move on to the next fair. A report of 12952 tells how the
pie powder court of St. Ives dealt with a charge by one merchant that
another one (probably his chief competitor) had called him "a thief and a
worthless merchant," very serious allegations for a man of his calling.
Unable to use a jury, the sole property of the royal courts, the pie powder
court of merchants at the fair employed the older proof by compurgation,
which it awarded to the defendant. Upon his failure to make this proof,
it ordered him to pay the plaintiff 12d, a moderate sum for that time.
III. STAR CIA1MER
The lack of a substantial remedy at common law for defamation be-
came a matter of concern for the crown, which disliked the settlement of
defamation issues by means of the duel, which produced family feuds and
internal disorder. Simultaneously, the crown was concerned with criticism
of its policies by newer middle-class men, who did not hold to the tradi-
tional view that government was ordained of God. The two concerns
joined in the statute of Edward I, De Scandalum Magnatum of 1275,26
which directed itself against the spreading of "false gossip" (largely by
word-of-mouth, but not excluding written expression) about the great
persons of the kingdom, described as being all prelates, dukes, earls,
barons, and the Chancellor, Treasurer, Clerk of the Council, Lord High
Steward, justices, and other great officials of the kingdom. The statute
decreed that persons spreading gossip about such persons should be
imprisoned until the originators of the stories could be found, then to be
dealt with, presumably, by the sedition laws.
The only satisfaction the statute gave to great men outraged by such
"gossip," which could be valid criticism, was to see those spreading it
23. PLUCKNETT, CONcIsE HISTORY OF THE COmmON LAw 462 (4th ad. 1948);
FiFoOT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 127.
24. 1 Edw. 3, c. 11 (1327).
25. Woodfool v. Pors, 23 Selden Soc. 71 (Fair Court of-St Ives 1295). This ease
is also discussed in FwoOT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 138-39.
26. Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 34 (1275).
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lodged in. jail. The statute also depended upon the common law courts
for its application; and while the justices were willing to construe the
statute as including the later-appearing rank of viscount,2 7 they hesitated
in the troubled 14th century to deal with critics of public officials, since
these critics, themselves, might be holding office in a short time. In 1389,
against a background of seething lower-class discontent, the recent Pea-
sants' Revolt, and struggling noble factions, Parliament re-enacted the
statute, but significantly gave its enforcement to the Council.28 The sub-
stitution was typical of prevailing Parliamentary belief that conciliar juris-
prudence was less subject to pressures by great magnates than were
common law courts and juries.
As the historical source of these courts and Chancery, the Council re-
tained residual jurisdiction, which it exercised in a summary, administrative
manner by ad hoc committees, whose decisions the overworked Council
approved in a pro forma manner. In its criminal equity business, of the
type conferred by the statute of 1389, the Council could order fines, with
imprisonment for failure to pay, and occasionally corporal punishment, but
never punishments of life or limb. During the 14th century the ad hoc
committee handling criminal equity became institutionalized as the Court
of Star Chamber, from the name of the room with stars painted on its
ceiling where this committee met. In 1486 Star Chamber received statutory
recognition in a law which indicated that the Chief Justices of King's
Bench and Common Pleas were permanent members,2 and that Star
Chamber could summon other common law justices to assist it.
From the mid-14th century down to 1540 Star Chamber reports were
entered on the Council Roll, 30 so that it is often difficult to determine
whether Star Chamber, the Council, or both took a certain action. After
that date Star Chamber had its separate record, but its personnel continued
to interlock with the Council.
Inevitably, the enforcement of the statute of 1389 fell to Star Chamber,
which viewed this duty, as also its others in criminal equity, in an adminis-
trative manner. For Star Chamber, as with the entire Council, the great
administrative duty and problem was the maintenance of internal order;
and Star Chamber regarded defamation as highly productive of disorder
so that it was criminal, or at the least, quasi-criminal. In implementing this
attitude, Star Chamber quickly came to ignore most oral defamations as
being numerous, but too fleeting to be of much effect. It was written
defamation, the poems, pamphlets, and squibs, in which 15th and 16th
27. Carr,- supra note 9, at 261.
28. 12 Rich. 2, c. 11 (1388).
29. 3 Hen. 7, c. 1 (1486). The wording of the statute clearly indicates the previous
existence of the court.
30. Carter, Court of Star Chamber, 18 L.Q. 1Ev. 247, 248-49 (1902). See also
Star Chamber Cases, 39 Camden Society.
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century England abounded, which came under Star Chamber's stem view.
The personnel and overriding attitude of the court made it view any
criticism of the government as a wrong to be punished. So consistent was
this policy that "libel," hitherto anything printed, came to mean a "false"
written statement, "scandalous," because it touched government policy.31
With its grounding in raison cratat, Star Chamber regarded any such
political libel as meriting a heavy fine. However, the court soon extended
its work into non-political, private libels, because they could produce
breaches of the peace, the thing Star Chamber was bound to preserve.
For upper-class men injured by defamatory imputations on their "honor,"
Star Chamber with one hand offered deterrence from the duel and with
the other presented a required alternative. The court would fine duellists
heavily, but it would compensate the injured party by ordering his de-
famer, or libeller, to pay him heavy damages.3 In its assessment of these
damages Star Chamber came close to the Roman law view that it was not
the actual damage, but the degree of insult which determined the exact
figure to be paid.
The view of Star Chamber that no defence was possible for a political
libel came rapidly to include private ones also. Thus the government,
public official, or private complainant had a great advantage in Star
Chamber, whose only question was whether the defendant had published,
or had caused to be published, the offending remarks. By the close of the
16th century the law of libel as developed and applied by Star Chamber
was extremely sharp. Private litigants, at least plaintiffs, had real induce-
ment to turn from the by-then rather meaningless remedy of penance of
the Church courts and from the monetary damages of the moribund
manorial courts, to Star Chamber. Its consistent favoring of the plaintiff
and the certainty that its orders for compensation payments by the de-
fendant would be enforced made it a popular tribunal for growing numbers
of people smarting under written imputations about their characters. In
addition to these advantages, Star Chamber was so concerned about the
need to maintain order that the death of one, or even both of the parties,
did not end a defamation cause before it.P Unlike the common law courts,
where actions terminated on the death of either party, Star Chamber would
press on in behalf of and/or against the heirs and personal representatives
of the parties.
The plaintiff in a libel cause before Star Chamber began and ended his
own efforts when he filed a bill with its clerk. From that point the court
took over the entire proceeding. As with the ecclesiastical courts, mem-
31. 8 HoLnSwoRT 336 (1926); FiFoOT op. cit. supra note 8, at 463; Veeder, supra
note 6, at 453, 455, 466.
32. Veeder, supra note 6, at 455; 5 HoLwSwonm 211 (1927).
33. 5 HoLnswoirr 211 (1927).
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bers of Star Chamber were judges equally of fact and law; and the essen-
tially administrative adjudication of the court made it less concerned about
the latter than in getting the former. Sworn oral testimony and affidavits,
the "paper-proof" so scored off by the common law, were grist for the mill
of Star Chamber, which could also order the ex-officio oath for the princi-
pals, particularly the defendant. If the court heard pleading at all, it was
by its own counsel, not of the litigants.34 On the basis of its findings, usually
the mere fact of publication, Star Chamber issued its order, generally
against the defendant, requiring him to pay a fine to the government, or
compensation to the plaintiff, or both. The order operated as a directive
to the sheriff to collect the money or distrain the goods of the defendant
until paid.
Crucially for the history of the law of libel, and probably inevitably
considering its basic orientation, Star Chamber gave short shrift to truth as
a defence.35 There could never be "truthful" written criticism of the
gracious sovereign and his officials, and the truthfulness of a libel against
a private person would not prevent his issuing a challenge and so breaching
the peace. The only "fact" therefore of much concern to Star Chamber was
that of publication; truth availed the defendant in a libel action but little
in Star Chamber.
In exercising its jurisdiction over libel, Star Chamber was assisted by
the practice of the government, consonant with general European practice,
of licensing the press.36 Since 1416, when Caxton had set up the first press
in England at Westminster, the control of printing had been under the
government, which rightly regarded it as important in a time when the
number of literate persons, although not large, was increasing. Government
control of the press was enhanced by the monopoly on printing granted in
1557 to the new Stationers' Company, except for the interesting and sig-
nificant exceptions of royal documents and the Law Reports, printed by
the order, respectively, of the crown and the judges. Even material printed
by authority of the Stationers' Company had to pass the scrutiny of either
the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Bishop of London, who could apply
to the Council (actually Star Chamber) for enforcement of their orders.
Unauthorized publications, and their printers and authors, fell under the
heavy displeasure of Star Chamber, which from time to time drafted press
regulations that when promulgated by the Council aimed at checking the
rash of pamphleteering during the religious and political controversies of
34. Actually, the counsel of Star Chamber were frequently its investigating agents
and therefore resembled the Masters of Chancery or the Masters of Requests more
than they did-,the common law counsel.
35. 8 HorLnswoRTH 336 (1926). However, he points out that in the very few cases
of oral defamation coming before Star Chamber, the defence of truth was permitted,
although its proof was extremely difficult.
36. Veeder, supra note 6, at 462.
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the Tudor and early Stuart periods. In 1637 very detailed press regulations
placed authorized publications under minute restrictions and subjected the
authors and printers of unauthorized ones to the penalties of libel imposed
by Star Chamber.3 7
IV. ComoaN LAW CouRTs-SLANDm
It was the lack of a monetary remedy for oral defamation which caused
the common law to take its first notice of any kind of defamation, long after
its doctrines were rigid. The Abridgements of the Year Books, which closed
in 1536, to be replaced by semi-official Law Reports, failed to show any
common law interest in defamation,3s whose oral variety thus fell to the
ecclesiastical courts applying "remedies" of scant merit to pushing middle-
class merchants or nobles with touchy "honors." In the last year of the
Year Books the justices refused to accept a suit of defamation between
anonymous parties in which one had called the other a "heretic," on the
grounds that the allegation, if true, would have fallen to the Church
courts, which as a consequence had sole jurisdiction over this particular
defamation. However, went on the justices, had the charge been one of a
crime indictable at common law, they would have accepted the action if
the plaintiff had alleged (and ultimately proven) temporal damages re-
sulting from the imputation.39
Thus, as the canon law had previously defined defamation by the
criterion of offenses under it, so now the common law applied the criterion
for defamation by allegations of crimes indictable under it,40 thereby
excluding, as had canon law, merely violent or offensive language from
its definition of defamation. This invitation to bring defamation actions
before the common law courts also indicated that the justices had solved
their previous dilemma as to how to measure damages for non-physical
words by approaching defamation as an action on the case. And while the
37. Id. at 463; 6 HoLDswoaTH 363, 367-68 (1927).
38. Carr, supra note 9, at 388. It is true that the Year Books do hint of 10 possible
defamation actions between 1327 and 1536, when they closed. But the Abridgements
simply do not mentibn defamation as a common law action.
39. Y. B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, pl. 4 (1536), cited in 3 HoLDswonTH 411 n.2 (1923).
40. This requirement that the allegation be of a crime indictable at common law
could produce some odd results for remedies for defamation. Thus a statute of 1570
gave jurisdiction over usury to the Church courts (An Act Against Usury, 13 Eliz. 1,
c. 8), so that imputation of usury would likewise fall to them and would not be
susceptible of monetary compensation for any damages caused thereby. Allegations of
certain sexual offenses, capable of producing extreme damage, were in the same cate-
gory. Thus charges of fornication, an offense "unknown" to the common law, would
receive no remedy from it. And until 1908, when incest was made a secular crime
(Punishment of Incest Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 45), an allegation of it would receive no
notice from the common law. In fact, between the abolition of defamation jurisdiction
of the ecclesiastical courts in 1855 (18 & 19 Vict., c. 41) and the latter date, there
was no remedy anywhere for such a false chargel
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invitation did not distinguish between oral and written defamation, the
realities of the situation, whereby Star Chamber gave swift and certain
remedies for libels, meant that if the invitation were accepted, the great
bulk of defamation cases flowing into the law courts would be of the oral
type, slander.
Above all, in great contrast to the libel doctrines of Star Chamber,
which were close to the Roman law view of injuria, the common law, even
while bringing defamation, largely slander, to it by way of the doctrine
of action on the case, insisted that damages be alleged and proved before
it would give relief.41 Although Sir Frederick Pollook would later greatly
regret that the common law had used the damage approach,42 it is difficult
to see how else the common law, long-formed by the mid-16th century,
could have come to grips with defamation, even of merely the slander
variety-particularly since it had no legislative, statutory assistance in
recognizing the tort action of slander.
The judicial invitation fell on the waiting ears of the middle-classes,
utterly dissatisfied with ecclesiastical reliefs for defamation and completely
delighted with those for libel accorded by Star Chamber. The result for
the common law courts was in inundation of slander actions in the latter
part of the 16th century. The justices, overworked with other litigation
and their duties in Star Chamber, the Council, and even Parliament, tried
to stem the flood they had unleashed by establishing limiting doctrines to
the remedy at law for defamation, in theory without regard as to whether
it was written or oral, but practically, in view of the exigencies of the
situation, applicable only to the tort of slander. The application of these
limiting rules only to slander actions would have major results for the
common law treatment of defamation.
Borrowing from canon law principles, the justices in their endeavor to
check the flood of slander actions insisted that the allegation had to be
precise as to the common law crime and the person thereby imputed to
have committed it. Vagueness on either count meant dismissal of the
action. The imputation, as also in canon law, had to be "published" to a
third party for the plaintiff to have suffered any damage. The words thus
spoken could be susceptible of no other meaning, a doctrine in great con-
trast to the grim view taken by Star Chamber of any written words. In
their own courts, however, common law justices sought to check the num-
ber of slander actions by applying the doctrine of mitior sensus, whereby
supposedly defamatory words, upon reconsideration and analysis by the
justices (who were very careful not to let the jury perform this function)
turned out to be no such thing, and so could not be actionable for the
excellent reason that these harmless, even laudatory words could not have
41. 8 Ho.aNsvoRTH 346 (1926).
42. POLLOCK, TORTS 193 (14th ed. 1939).
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produced damage. Some remarkable judicial acrobatics in applying mitior
sensus did check the flow of slander actions, which was franldy admitted
by Chief Justice Wray in 1585 to be the purpose of the doctrine.
43
Only if the plaintiff surmounted these obstacles might his allegations
that the words had been uttered and had caused him damage go to the
jury for determination as issues of fact, with the measurement of damage
to be made by the jury as the final issue of fact. But here, completely
different from the libel doctrines of Star Chamber, and like the canon law
of ecclesiastical courts, the common law gave the defendant the complete
defence of truth. Canon law had permitted this defence for the reason
that a true allegation, no matter how defamatory, could not be false and
so was not the sin of false witness. The common law permitted the de-
fence of truth for the different reason that a true statement, regardless of
its defamation, could not have caused damage.44 However, in letting the
defence of truth go to the jury as an issue of fact, the common law justices
in their own courts recognized a freedom of speech in slander actions which
they consistently refused to accept in the libel cases coming before them in
Star Chamber. The result was that where Star Chamber refused to con-
sider truth in libel proceedings, a common law jury could find for the
defendant in its verdict by finding the truth of his imputations.
After the initial flood of slander actions had subsided, partially because
of these judicial doctrines, the common law justices during the first half
of the 17th century refined their doctrines on slander, so that certain types
did not have to be proven on the case, but were slander per se, certain
to cause damage by virtue of the relationship of the particular imputation
to the common law. Here the plaintiff, while having to allege the damages,
need not prove them, although their actual measurement was by the
jury. Thus the allegation of an indictable crime was slander per se, because
if true, the charge would have deprived the plaintiff of his liberty and
even his life. Similarly, the allegation of a loathsome, contagious disease
(initially leprosy, although later enlarged to include venereal disease) was
slander per se, because if true, it would have caused the issuance against
the plaintiff of the writ de leproso amovendo, cutting him off from society.
The third type of slander per se, reflecting middle-class concern about
commercial fiscal standing, was the imputation of unfitness of the plaintiff
in his trade or profession, including, interestingly, judicial office, as to
cause prejudice to his position and so rendering him liable to a reduction
in income.15 This judicial reasoning as to results was probably the reverse
43. 8 HoLDswoRTH 353-55 (1926); Carr, supra note 9, at 257-58. The doctrine of
mitior sensus apparently first applied in Stanhope v. Blith, 4 Co. Rep. 15 a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 891 (K.B. 1585), produced some remarkable judicial "logic," such as viewing a
"forger" as simply an honest blacksmith and a "coiner" as an employee of the Mint.
44. Veeder, supra note 6, at 458.
45. Ibid.; Carr, supra note 9, at 257. Also see for 17th century views on slander
1065
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
of middle-class attitude of the early 17th century, but the inclusion of
imputations upon judicial competence was obviously a self-protective de-
vice created by royal justices who were finding that middle-class self-
assurance extended to criticism of the bench.
With the exceptions of the actions of slander per se, slander remained
an action on the case, with the plaintiff required to allege and prove a
precise connection between the defamatory words and the damages suffered
by him. In both types of slander actions the jury could as a practical matter
mitigate damages and could find for the defendant by finding that his
words had been true. Although the common law did not say that its doc-
trines on defamation applied only to the oral type, the realities of the
juridical situation in the early 17th century caused them to govern only
the tort of slander. Libel fell almost entirely to Star Chamber, which
only rarely took note of oral defamation. Practically, therefore, by the
mid-17th century there were three separate systems of jurisprudence for
defamation. That of the canon law, viewing defamation as a sin to be
corrected, had lost most of its jurisdiction because of the inadequacy and
uncertainty of its remedies for middle-class people. The two active juridical
systems were the administrative one of Star Chamber and the common law.
The former, largely for libel, had severe doctrines; the latter, almost en-
tirely for slander, had somewhat more moderate ones. But the functional
difference between the courts applying their doctrines on defamation as to
libel and slander respectively meant an accentuation in the difference
between libel and slander law.
This division was agreeable to the common law justices, who saw no
reason to add libel actions to those of slander in their clogged courts. The
monopoly by Star Chamber over libel cases was approved by that champion
of the common law, Sir Edward Coke, who as Chief Justice of Common
Pleas had participated in the handling by Star Chamber of the Libellis
Famosis case, which Coke reported in 1609 with an obvious satisfaction
amounting to personal relish.46 The cause arose out of an anonymous dog-
gerel about the Archbishop of Canterbury, who died before the case came
on before Star Chamber, and his successor, the then Bishop of London.
When the anonymous writer and printer of the poem was uncovered, Star
Chamber moved with vigorous alacrity. In the subsequent hearing the
court refined its doctrines on libel by adopting as its own the later Roman
law of libellis famosis (which thus gave its name to the case), with
Coke's approval. Where earlier Roman law had punished only libels
with ascertained authors, later Roman law viewed anonymous publications 47
and slander per se MARCH, AcnoN FOR SLANDER (1648); STA=.CIE, A TnmArs ON
TH= LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBm (1813); FoLxARD, STm ON SLANDEM AND LInEL
(4th ed. 1877).
46. 5 Co. Rep. 125 a, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Chamber 1606).
47. Veeder, supra note 6, at 464-65.
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as being nearly criminal. The application and interpretation by Star
Chamber of this later Roman legal dictum in this case moved the English
law of libel, at least as applied by Star Chamber, still closer to criminal
law and left only licensed publications beyond its possible application. In
his report Coke admitted that the injured parties might have applied to the
law courts for relief, but he clearly indicated that Star Chamber was the
proper tribunal for libels, particularly of this anonymous type:
[F]or in a settled state of Government the party grieved ought to com-
plain for every injury done him in an ordinary course of law, and not by any
means to revenge himself,... and of such [secret] nature [as poisoning] is
libelling. . . .and therefore when the offender is known, he ought to be
severely punished.48
When the bulwark of the common law held such an attitude, lesser
justices were unlikely to add written defamations to the slander actions
presently handled by their courts. Coke and his brethren were men of the
upper classes, profoundly conscious of how narrow was the line between
internal order and anarchy, and they clearly regarded the tort-damage ap-
proach of the common law to slander as insufficient to deal with libel.
Instead, they preferred to have administrative jurisprudence with much
more stringent doctrines deal with libels, rather than seek to assimilate
them to the common law tort of slander. Thus by the mid-17th century
the common law had come to "know" slander; it had yet to recognize libel.
V. SEPAR onoN OF LmE. AND SLANDER iN = CoMMoN LAw
The Parliamentary onslaught against non-common law tribunals in 1640
forced the common law to take notice of libel. Parliamentary wrath felled
both of the other two forums exercising competence over defamation, the
ecclesiastical courts and Star Chamber;49 and while the former were re-
stored in 1661,50 their procedure of the ex-officio oath, likewise abolished
twenty years previously, was not restored 5' thereby leaving the Church
courts with their historical jurisdiction over defamation, but without any
practical means to exercise it. And while these courts would not formally
lose their jurisdiction over defamation until 1855,52 practically they ceased
to exercise any portion of it after 1641. For the law of defamation this
cessation of interest by ecclesiastical courts was not serious, inasmuch as
they had been moribund for a good century before that date. However,
48. Libelis Famosis, supra note 46, at 77 Eng. Rep. 251. The case is also dated as
being in 1606 and is sometimes said to have involved a poem against the Archbishop
of York.
49. 16 Car. 1, c. 10, 11 (1640).
50. 13 Car. 2, c. 12 (1661).
51. Id. § 4.
52. 18 & 19 Vict., c. 41 (1855).
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the abolition of Star Chamber in 1641 and the failure to re-establish it in
1661 meant that after the earlier date there was no remedy for libel, be-
cause the common law had not come to "know" it.
After 1661 the common law moved into areas hitherto occupied by
royal administrative jurisprudence. In its treatment of defamation the com-
mon law thus had a great opportunity to create a single tort by extending
its doctrines on slander to libel. Instead, both justices and Parliament
ignored the opportunity, so that the common law view of defamation be-
came inexorably different from Roman law systems. The explanation for
this apparent common law lapse lies in the turbulent history of the later
17th century.
During the Interregnum, the pre-Civil War alliance between common
law supporters and Parliamentary leaders had disintegrated when the
latter used their claim of Parliamentary supremacy during the Common-
wealth phase of the kingless decade to legislate on the basic law. The
experience had turned common law justices into strong supporters of the
royal prerogative after 1660, imbuing them with a determination to main-
tain it against criticism of government, especially of the damaging written
variety. Parliamentary leaders, now divided into Whigs and Tories, were
willing to see a rigorous treatment of such criticism when it came from
their opponents, momentarily the "outs." Thus neither bench nor legis-
lature was in a mood to regard written defamation simply as a tort; each
approached it along the historical line that libel was political, or at least
quasi-political, with the state justified in suppressing it.
In harmony with this attitude, the government continued the practice
of its predecessors, including those of the Interregnum, of licensing the
,press, a practice receiving statutory authority in 1662 in an act of Parlia-
ment embodying the very stringent regulations of 1637 by Star Chamber,5 3
which the Council had then promulgated. This act remained in effect until
1679 when it expired in the bitter controversy to bar James, Duke of York,
the Catholic heir of Charles II, from the royal succession. Immediately
there was a burst of "unauthorized" pamphleteering, largely by Whigs, and
often violently opposed to prevailing royal religious and foreign policy.
One particularly virulent publication by Henry Carr, The Weekly Pacquet
of Advice from Rome, or the History of Popery, stirred the king into asking
the justices in 1680 whether prosecution of Carr for seditious libel was
possible in the absence of statutory authorization to license the press.
Headed by Chief Justice Sir William Scroggs of King's Bench, the justices,
With their Restoration prerogative orientation, unanimously advised that
uch a prosecution was possible in that royal power to license the press
was not statutorily derived but was part of the royal prerogative.5 4 This
53. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33 (1662).
54. 7 State Tr. 1111 .(Nisi Prius 1680).
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was to bring forward the political libel doctrines of the dead Star Chamber.
When the government prosecuted Carr for seditious libel, Scroggs went
further in instructing the jury that any publication printed without govern-
ment permission and which was "scandalous" (that is, offensive) to it,
public officials, or private persons by conveying "false" news was an
indictable offense at common law.55 Soon afterward in R. V. Harris5 6 the
Chief Justice declared flatly that no public or private dissemination of news
was legal without government permission and that lacking such authoriza-
tion, the dissemination, no matter how narrow or by what means, con-
stituted a breach of the peace.
This was to soar on royal prerogative to new heights and to move Star
Chamber views on political libel into the criminal side of the common
law, so that the Restoration had numerous trials for seditious libel, culmi-
nating in that of the Seven Bishops in 1688,57 when the jury thwarted the
bench by a verdict simply of Not Guilty. More important for the law of
libel was judicial insistence, resting upon the prerogative attitude of the
Restoration bench, that the only issue for jury determination in such
trials for seditious libel was that of publication; the truth or falsity of
the statement was a matter of law for judicial decision. In their decisions
on this issue the justices continued the view of Star Chamber that written
criticism of the government must always be "false" and so merited condign
punishment. For the same reason Restoration justices would not permit
the defence of truth any more than had Star Chamber in seditious libel
cases.
Thus the Restoration bench was treating seditious libel in a completely
different manner from the common law tort of slander. The former was
criminal without the defence of truth; the latter was civil with numerous
restrictions and with the defence of truth the best possible one. What is
interesting is that politicians in Parliament did not object to these strong
judicial doctrines on seditious libel. In 1680 a change in the political tides
caused the House of Commons to impeach Scroggs on various charges,
59
among them, not that he had enunciated this high prerogative doctrine
borrowed from Star Chamber about the press, but that he had applied
it to Protestants 60 Both Whigs and Tories used their sojourns in power to
muzzle the press of their opponents. The brevity and acrimony of Parlia-
mentary sessions prevented a renewal of the licensing act until 1685, when
one was enacted for seven years,61 thereby continuing it through the
55. Id. at 1124-30.
56. 7 State Tr. 926 (Nisi Prins 1680).
57. 3 Mod. 212, 87 Eng. Rep. 136 (K.B. 1688). For a more detailed account, see
12 State Tr. 183.
58. 8 HoLDswoRTH 343 (1926).
59. He was dismissed before being brought to trial.
60. 8 HoLDswoRmT 340 (1926).
61. 1 Jac. 2, c. 17 § 15 (1685).
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Revolution of 1688-1689 to 1692, when it was renewed for two years.62
After 1694, however, neither party was willing to give statutory authority
to the crown to license the press, but the common law continued to view
printed criticism of the government with doubt, although in the post-
Revolutionary climate of Parliamentary supremacy without the prerogative
fervor of Scroggs. Nevertheless in 1704 Chief Justice Holt of King's Bench,
The Queen v. Tutchin,63 felt compelled to indicate the law's doubt about
such printed criticism. Not until 1765 did Chief Justice Lord Camden of
King's Bench in Entick v. Carrington6 end common law hesitation about
written criticism of government policy by declaring that the views of
Scroggs, and by inference the decisions resting on them, had been extra-
judicial and invalid.65
By that time, however, the nervous concern of Restoration judges about
political libel had blocked any possible movement toward the assimilation
of libel and slander into a single tort of defamation. With their eyes riveted
on the form of defamation and with their concern about political libel,
the justices came to view private libel in almost the same manner as had
Star Chamber. In 1670 Chief Baron Hale in the case of King v. Lake66
took the crucial step in separating libel and slander in the common law.
The action arose from the written statement by the defendant that a
petition by the plaintiff, a barrister, was "stuffed with illegal assertions,
ineptitudes, imperfections, clogged with gross ignorances, absurdities and
solecisms....67 Counsel for King urged that these words if spoken would
have been slander per se as imputing professional incompetence, so that
by analogy they were now actionable as libel. Defence counsel argued
that the words would not have supported a slander action as they lacked
a precise allegation of such incompetence.
Hale, a Restoration justice, if a particularly independent one, did not
flinch and held the word actionable, because "although such general words
spoken once, without writing or publishing them, would not be actionable;
yet here they being writ and published, which contains more malice, than if
they had but been once spoken, they are actionable."68 Although super-
ficially Hale might have seemed to have joined libel with at least slander
per se, actually his ruling had set out libel as a separate tort, with doctrines
62. The statute (4 & 5 W. & M., c. 24 (1692)) renewed various expiring legisla-
tion, including that for licensing the press (section 14).
63. 1 Salk. 51, 91 Eng. Rep. 50 (K.B. 1704). For a more detailed account, see
14 State Tr. 1095.
64. 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). For a more detailed account, see
19 State Tr. 1030.
65. Id. at 19 State Tr. 1070.
66. Hardres 470, 145 Eng. Rep. 552 (Exch. 1670). For an entertaining report of the
case see HiCKSON & CATEn-RucK, op. cit. supra note 21, at 17-18.
67. Id. at 145 Eng. Rep. 552.
68. Id. at 145 Eng. Rep. 553. 8 HoLDswoRTH 343 (1926).
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apart from those of slander and coming from the extinct Star Chamber.
For Hale, the "malice" in this private libel made it different from slander,
so that unlike slander, and like slander per se, the plaintiff need not allege
and prove resultant damages. But unlike slander per se, and like seditious
libel, the issue of fact for jury determination in an action of private libel
was not the truth of the allegation but the fact of publication. The most
that common law justices, who would not accept truth as a defence in
seditious libel, would do for truth in a private libel action was to consider
is at a matter of law! The steadfast refusal of justices to permit juries to
consider this defence in seditious libel cases made them extend this denial
to private libel actions. The result for the common law was that libel be-
came a separate tort with quasi-punitive overtones, possessing much more
stringent doctrines than did slander, or even slander per se. Not until
1792 did Fox's Libel Act permit a jury in a libel case to return a verdict
simply of Not Guilty,69 thereby indicating, if indirectly, its belief in the
truth of the written defamatory statement.
By that time, however, slander and libel were torts so separate, with
such different definitions and defences, that their merger into a single tort
of defamation was impossible except by legislative action, and Parliament
showed no willingness to move in this direction. The only explanation for
their separation was historical, the "reception" of each of them separately
by the common law, late and in a hurry because of forces external to it.
The division was hopelessly illogical, as Chief Justice Mansfield had to
admit in Thorley v. Lord Kerry70 in 1812 (the Bumble view), but also it
was now too late to reverse history (the Holmesian antidote).
69. 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792).
70. 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (Exch. Ch. 1812).
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